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International Adjudication
The Pinochet Effect. Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights. By
Naomi Roht-Arriaza. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2005. Pp. vii, 256. Price: $44 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Stacie Jonas.
Human rights advocates hailed the 1998 arrest of former Chilean
dictator Augusto Pinochet in London as a landmark victory in the effort to
hold rights violators accountable for their crimes. Nearly seven years later,
however, Pinochet has yet to be convicted, and attempts to use universal
jurisdiction to bring other dictators to justice have faced significant setbacks.
Exactly what are the lessons to be drawn from the legal cases against
Pinochet?
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, a professor at Hastings College of Law, addresses
this question in The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of
Human Rights. This highly readable and dramatic narrative offers important
lessons for future attempts to hold human rights violators accountable.
Tracing the history of the Pinochet litigation in Spain, the United Kingdom,
Chile, and other countries around the world, Roht-Arriaza analyzes the
complex dynamics of recent efforts to seek justice for human rights crimes in
national courts. Maintaining that the Pinochet case gave "new teeth" to
international law and led to greater justice in Chile (p. 66), she concludes that
the primary value of transnational cases such as the Pinochet litigation lies in
their ability to "prompt investigations and prosecutions at home" (p. 223).
Roht-Arriaza sets the stage with a behind-the-scenes look at the origins
of the Pinochet litigation in the Spanish and British courts. While her account
begins in the mid-1990s, it also makes clear that these cases had a much
longer trajectory and were driven by people with close, long-term ties to Chile
and Argentina. "It could not have been done," she stresses, "without
preexisting contacts and correspondence among the various lawyers and local
human rights groups" (p. 211).
The persistent efforts of these groups and individuals helped keep
Pinochet under house arrest in London for nearly sixteen months but were
ultimately unsuccessful in securing his extradition to Spain. By the time
Pinochet was sent home in 2000 on highly contested medical grounds,
however, the Spanish case against the aging general had transformed the legal
and political landscape in Chile. Encouraged by the arrest and extradition
proceedings, victims had filed more than sixty complaints against Pinochet in
Chile; by 2004, the complaints mounted to over three hundred. Shortly after
Pinochet's return to his home country, Chilean courts stripped the former
dictator of his immunity, and Judge Juan Guzmdn indicted Pinochet for his
role in crimes committed shortly after the 1973 coup that brought him to
power.
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After detailing the transformation of Pinochet from "untouchable" to
"the most complained-against man in Chile," Roht-Arriaza addresses the
question, "how did it happen?" (p. 85). Drawing from interviews with
individuals close to the case, she suggests that a combination of domestic
judicial reform and the case against Pinochet in Spain served as the catalyst.
The extradition proceedings in London prompted the Chilean government to
promise that Chilean courts would try Pinochet. Chilean human rights lawyers
additionally note that some local judges "realized that there was unfinished
business" and "became painfully aware that the judiciary hadn't taken
seriously its role during the dictatorship" (pp. 85-86). The international
publicity surrounding the Spanish case against Pinochet gave Chilean human
rights groups new visibility and showed the right-wing and the military that
much of the world saw their hero as a criminal. The case also affected civil-
military relations, "convincing the heads of the armed forces that time alone
would not make the issue of past human rights abuses go away" (p. 87).
Under "enormous pressure" from a government "looking for a graceful
way out" (p. 83), the Chilean courts have repeatedly shut down cases against
Pinochet on health grounds and technicalities. Although Pinochet has never
been convicted, Roht-Arriaza nevertheless considers the cases against him a
success. The "wall of impunity" in Chile has been cracked, and a "rough kind
of justice" has been done (p. 96). Pinochet's legacy is now that of an indicted
criminal. Hundreds of new human rights cases against lower-level military
officials have advanced in Chile, some based on principles of international
law. Dozens of new books, television specials, and documentaries about
issues surrounding the case have emerged, prompting new discussions and
dialogue about human rights and dictatorship. Internationally, the case has
"made clear that there are some limits to the immunity of government officials
when hauled before national courts accused of international crimes";
furthermore, the affair has "strengthened the idea that proper accountability
for such crimes is the business of justice everywhere" (p. 197).
Roht-Arriaza goes on to examine the impact of transnational litigation
on efforts to promote truth and justice in other countries, particularly in
Argentina regarding the 1976-1983 "dirty war." She also provides a unique
and much-needed account of the development of other cases against Argentine
and Chilean human rights violators in Europe and the United States, including
intricate details about how universal jurisdiction and transnational justice play
out in diverse legal settings. This assessment offers a rare glimpse into how
judges in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United States have
collaborated with each other and with their Latin American counterparts,
reflecting the ways these investigations have complemented and fed off one
another.
Despite Roht-Arriaza's optimism about the impact of the Pinochet affair,
her examination of the transnational cases filed in the wake of Pinochet's
arrest raises difficult questions about the future of universal jurisdiction
prosecutions in domestic courts. Subsequent cases in Spain, Belgium, and
Senegal did not fare as well as their Argentine and Chilean equivalents-
instead, they led to a tightening and narrowing of universal jurisdiction in
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those countries. Although critical of these new restrictions, Roht-Arraiza
concludes that they may be the inevitable result of the "natural evolution of a
new regime" (p. 197).
Roht-Arriaza recognizes the challenges and difficulties that transnational
prosecutions in domestic courts entail. She addresses some of the most
common criticisms of universal jurisdiction-including concerns about
national amnesty laws and politically motivated cases-and lucidly defends
the accomplishments of transnational human rights litigation to date. She also
raises important questions about the need for a more balanced, globalized
system of justice that targets human rights violators from strong as well as
weak countries. While transnational prosecutions will "never be the only
mechanism for achieving justice," she acknowledges, "they are one piece of
the emerging architecture" (p. 198).
Another pillar of this new architecture is the International Criminal
Court (ICC). According to Roht-Arriaza, the advent of the ICC does not make
transnational human rights cases in domestic courts unnecessary. Instead, she
proposes that the two systems can and should work in tandem. Noting
limitations on the ICC's jurisdiction and resources, she asserts that
"transnational prosecutions have the potential to fill the gap.., and to act as
an adjunct and multiplier of the emerging international criminal
jurisprudence" (p. 201).
Roht-Arriaza also argues that the ICC must learn from transnational
cases the importance of engaging and empowering victims. By contrast, she
suggests that the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
suffered from a "lack of grounding" in local realities and had a "mixed impact
on victims and local justice processes" (pp. 203-04).
Although several books and articles have surveyed aspects of the
Pinochet litigation, Roht-Arriaza's account stands out as both sufficiently
sophisticated to engage law students and legal scholars and highly accessible
to a broader audience. The text occasionally warrants an additional footnote
and at times challenges the reader to keep track of myriad people, places, and
dates. Overall, though, Roht-Arriaza's book is a remarkable testament to the
countless "ordinary and extraordinary people" who have spent much of their
lives in the struggle for truth and justice (p. xiii), and it is a valuable resource
for anyone who might pursue transnational human rights litigation in the
future.
Compliance with the Decisions of the International Court of Justice. By
Constanze Schulte. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pp.
xxxiii, 485. Price: $150.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Adam Strait.
Constanze Schulte's new book, Compliance with the Decisions of the
International Court of Justice, offers a detailed survey of the jurisprudence of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and a careful assessment of the degree
to which its decisions have been implemented. Unfortunately, Schulte, an
attorney who practices in Spain, never quite reaches the more interesting
underlying question of the court's legitimacy as an enunciator of international
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legal norms. Moreover, as recent events show, her focus on formal
compliance alone is too sterile to serve as a good proxy for such a complex
inquiry. By simultaneously authorizing post-conviction hearings for Mexican
nationals, as ordered in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v.
United States), and withdrawing from the Optional Protocol of the Vienna
Convention for Consular Relations, for example, the George W. Bush
administration demonstrated how a country might formally obey and yet
practically undermine the ICJ.
Schulte's predominant model of the court is as an independent,
extranational judicial body interested in preserving its own authority. Consider
Shulte's emphasis in her analysis of the ICJ's decision in LaGrand (Germany
v. United States), where the court upheld the binding power of its own
provisional measures and ordered the United States to allow for some form of
review and reconsideration of cases in which aliens were not informed of their
right to contact their consulate before being convicted of a crime, a right
conferred by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna
Convention). Schulte writes that the judgment "shifted the focus . . . [to]
observance of a legal obligation, not mere respect for recommendations" (p.
12). For Schulte, then, the ICJ does more than assert a normative claim; it
creates a positive rule of law. Indeed, the ICJ in LaGrand arrogates to itself
both types of power. After acknowledging that it does not control the sword or
purse, the court noted that "[t]he lack of means of execution and the lack of
binding force are two different matters."1 This view, however, arguably lacks
sensitivity toward the sovereignty of individual nations that go before the ICJ.
The United States, in particular, has always been leery of allowing the court's
normative and positive functions to overlap, since acknowledging the court's
positive rule-making authority might give the ICJ the power to oversee U.S.
domestic affairs. Schulte seems to assume that the sum of various state
interests determines both whether to bring a case and whether to comply with
a judgment (regardless of its legal obligation). For example, she writes that
"[n]on-compliance might give rise to new political tensions, and the efficacy
of the post-adjudicative phase will . . . be determined . . . by immediate
political action" (p. 19). Her view, however, fails adequately to consider the
fact that the legitimacy of the court is based on the complying country's
perception of the court's process. If a state perceives the ICJ as acting ultra
vires, it has an incentive not only to fail to comply with any judgment
rendered on a particular matter but also to attack the ICJ's underlying
legitimacy as a promulgator of international norms.
The recent U.S. decision to comply with Avena, coupled with its
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, provides a timely example of such an
attack. It also illuminates the limitations of Schulte's focus on compliance.
The Bush administration believes it is "for the President, not the courts, to
determine whether the United States should comply with the [ICJ's Avena]
decision, and, if so, how." 2 In agreeing to comply, the administration only
1. LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 3, para. 107 (June 27).
2. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9, Medellin v.
Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (No. 04-5928.
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invoked the principle of comity, thereby skirting the question of whether the
judgment had created a legal obligation for the United States. This decision
was not, as Schulte would have it, a calculation of international political
forces, nor was it a bow to the normative authority of the ICJ. Instead, it was
probably a tactical choice based on domestic institutions: granting the Avena
hearings was probably intended to render moot the issue before the U.S.
Supreme Court in Medellin v. Dretke, a case in which a Mexican defendant
sought to enforce the provisions of the Vienna Convention against Texas. The
grant of hearings forestalls the chance that the justices in Washington would
expand the normative authority of ICJ decisions in U.S. courts-not an
unthinkable jurisprudential shift given the density of international law
citations in Roper v. Simmons, the recent case forbidding capital punishment
of juveniles.
The difficulty of analyzing Avena under Schulte's bare compliance
framework is compounded by the U.S. withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol. Even if the post-conviction hearings of Avena and the other
convicted Mexican nationals are smoothly implemented, it will be impossible
to test whether these measures in fact constitute adequate compliance under
the Avena standard, since the ICJ no longer has power to examine them. On a
similar note, the U.S. State Department framed the decision to give hearings
in terms of international commitments rather than legal obligations, perhaps
emphasizing that the U.S. concern was for bilateral relations and not for the
court's legitimacy.
This piecemeal delegitimation of the ICJ will have repercussions beyond
the instant case. Rational state actors who consider it in their best interests to
engage the United States in multilateral institutions may hesitate to bring
another suit for fear it will cause Washington to disavow another formal
commitment. The U.S. decision to withdraw from the Optional Protocol goes
beyond mere jurisdiction-stripping: it clearly demonstrates that a suit against
the United States can result in fewer international legal constraints on the
world's superpower, not more. This observation suggests that the role of the
court in the future will be more arbitral and less adjudicative. Such a change
will not necessarily hurt its overall prestige, but it will certainly affect its
ability to constrain superpowers.
The closest analogy to Avena is the 1986 case Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), which also sits uneasily in Schulte's
framework. In that case, too, the United States publicly refused to comply
with an adverse ICJ decision and withdrew from the court's compulsory
jurisdiction. It is still unclear what effect that decision had on the court's
legitimacy. Since Nicaragua, in terms of pure activity, the court has been as
healthy as ever. It has shown, too, through the Vienna Convention cases of
LaGrand and Avena, that it will still call the United States to account where it
has compulsory jurisdiction. Schulte even suggests that the court's health is
attributable to the Nicaragua judgment, which "enhanced [the court's]
legitimacy with developing states" by showing them that all nations are equal
before the ICJ (p. 211). There is a simpler explanation that fits the facts just as
well. Since June 1986, when the Nicaragua judgment was handed down,
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global commerce and interaction have grown explosively. It seems only
natural that a greater number of interactions between countries would lead to a
greater number of suits before the court. Increased volume does not indicate,
however, whether the court will be taking a more expansive role in
interpreting positive international law, or whether it will simply act as a
mediator. Furthermore, the only times the United States has appeared as a
party before the ICJ since Nicaragua have been as a defendant in the Vienna
Convention cases. With the ICJ stripped of jurisdiction in that type of case
since Washington's withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, the circumstances
under which it will be necessary for the United States to go before the court
again are not immediately clear. It seems most likely that it will go at times of
its own choosing; therefore, bare compliance is not a useful yardstick when
examining the degree to which the ICJ can constrain U.S. activities.
Despite its narrow analysis, Schulte's book remains a valuable
contribution to the field because of the depth and breadth of her research. By
assembling primary source documents and providing clear, concise capsule
summaries of the cases before the ICJ and their implementation, she has
supplied an excellent starting point for inquiries into ICJ jurisprudence. The
analysis in Compliance with the Decisions of the International Court of
Justice delivers precisely what the title promises. Unfortunately, when
compliance is no longer an adequate measure of the power of the court, that
promise is not quite enough.
Historical and Comparative Foundations
The American Tradition of International Law: Great Expectations 1789-
1914. By Mark Weston Janis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Pp. vii, 156. Price: $46.92 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Yuval Miller.
Mark Weston Janis's The American Tradition of International Law:
Great Expectations 1789-1914, the first of a two-volume intellectual history,
assembles seemingly unrelated pieces of historical evidence into a
surprisingly cohesive story. The book recounts an ardent nineteenth-century
debate in the United States about the new country's proper legal relationship
to other nations and about the usefulness of international law for American
jurists.
The approach taken by Janis, the William F. Starr Professor of Law at
the University of Connecticut School of Law, is refreshingly human. He lets
his subjects' lives and work guide the historical account, avoiding overbroad
argumentation. Richly portrayed, the characters even dictate the organization
of the book, as chapters are grouped by profession: Jurists, Lawyers and
Judges, Utopians, Scientists, and Dreamers and Diplomats. Beginning in
1789, when Jeremy Bentham coined the term "international law" to
distinguish it from William Blackstone's "law of nations," the chapters
loosely track a chronological crescendo of voices calling for increased
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recognition of international law-a crescendo ever challenged by two factors,
positivism and American exceptionalism.
The book's chief weakness is that while the author provides
considerable factual detail, he fails to give sufficient explanation of the
historical conditions he describes. For example, Janis suggests that Americans
have a theoretical aversion to the traditional natural law approach to
international law expounded by early theorists such as Grotius and
Blackstone, but he never explains why this is so. Similarly, he discusses
American exceptionalism at some length but never explains why Americans
were skeptical that the country's unique institutions could mesh effectively
with the European law of nations. The book is intellectual history, not
sociology; still, a critical reader will yearn for more in-depth analysis and
explanation.
The American Tradition of International Law also falls somewhat short
as a historical text because Janis' story is obscured by the book's organization
according to professions. For instance, Janis could usefully have distinguished
what seem from his book to be two distinct historical periods. In the early
nineteenth century, Janis' characters fervently debated the proper place of
international law in America, its proponents emphasizing the discipline's
potential to boost U.S. stature in the world and its opponents arguing that
international law should not be considered law at all. After the Civil War,
however, his characters take a different tack; international law proponents
push not for domestic recognition of international law but for its employment
in maintaining world peace. Many such chronological trends are insufficiently
explored and so must be inferred by the reader.
Janis makes one remarkable historical relationship crystal clear: Early
American jurists played an unexpectedly vital role in stirring a debate that led
directly to the establishment of international modes of peaceful dispute
settlement. Early nineteenth-century jurists influenced mid-nineteenth-century
Utopians, whose peace movements in turn influenced late-nineteenth-century
positivist jurists (i.e., scientists) and diplomats, who then set the intellectual
foundations for and precipitated the creation of such notable institutions as the
Permanent Court of Arbitration. Janis's book is unique in recognizing the
strength of these century-long connections and in its character-led depiction of
their significance.
Janis's depiction of early American debates among jurists is carefully
detailed and well presented. He describes how the jurists James Kent and
Henry Wheaton managed to trump their positivist critics by inventing a
unique limiting principle for the law of nations-what Wheaton called "the
international law of Christendom" (quoted on p. 25). Influential critics such as
John Austin had claimed that international law could not be real law because
it depended upon "moral sanctions: by fear on the part of nations, or by fear
on the part of sovereigns" (quoted on p. 15). Kent and Wheaton avoided this
problem by demonstrating that moral sanctions can be effective so long as
they are limited to a circle of "civilized Christian state[s]" (p. 38).
Janis successfully argues that while some nineteenth-century Americans
were hostile to international law, "it was assumed by lawyers and judges at the
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outset of the American legal system that, when propounding the law of
nations, they were referring to an objectively identifiable body of law; they
made use of the standard treatises and other authorities for explicating the
doctrine" (p. 61). Janis adduces substantial evidence to support this
assessment, including Alexander Hamilton's observation that it was
"indubitable that the customary law of European nations is a part of the
common law, and, by adoption, that of the United States" (quoted on p. 56).
Janis makes clear that natural law was accepted in the early republic, but
he fails to make explicit why its popularity declined. The reader must strain to
deduce an explanation from the text. One possible account focuses
specifically on American skepticism about the compatibility of U.S.
institutions with those of the rest of the world-American exceptionalism.
Janis's only thoroughgoing exploration of exceptionalism, however, is his
analysis of the infamous Dred Scott case.
Janis depicts Dred Scott as a significant break from prior Supreme Court
decisions, exemplifying the court's reluctance to allow international law to
interfere with U.S. federalism. In the majority opinion, "[Justice] Taney, in
language echoed by more modem American judges, explicitly rejected
applying international legal rules because 'the law of nations [could not stand]
between the people of the United States and their Government"' (p. 93).
Janis convincingly argues that Dred Scott, and the Civil War that
followed it, dealt a dire blow to natural law conceptions of the law of nations
in U.S. courts and inspired Utopians and scientists to make international law
palatable to the positivist mainstream. He also correctly recognizes that the
decision "foreshadowed modem legal expressions of American
exceptionalism" (p. 94). As one example, last year, in reaction to several
Supreme Court cases citing international decisions, two Republican House
members, Tom Feeney and Bob Goodlatte, joined by over fifty co-sponsors,
proposed a resolution to express Congress' "sense" that judicial decisions
should not be based on foreign laws or court decisions. 3 Upon introducing the
resolution, Congressman Feeney warned that reference to such sources would
subject judges to "the 'ultimate remedy' of impeachment. ' 4
In a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee, Congressman
Feeney stressed that the resolution "doesn't prohibit any court from ever
looking at foreign laws as long as those laws 'inform an understanding of the
original meaning' of American law.5 The irony in the statement is laid bare
in Janis' book, which poignantly shows that this "original meaning" did
include courts' use of international and foreign decisions. As Justice Marshall
wrote, "[t]he decisions of the Courts of every country, so far as they are
founded upon a law common to every country, will be received, not as
authority, but with respect" (quoted on p. 64).
3. H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004).
4. See Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Resumes His Call for Judicial Independence, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at A10.
5. Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing
on H.R. 568 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Tom Feeney,
Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary) (quoting H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004)).
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The first volume of The American Tradition of International Law ends with
the onset of World War I. Janis provides a gripping account of how the war
confronted the proponents of international law-largely members of the peace
movement-with a significant challenge. The focus on character development
here, as throughout the book, makes it hard to put down despite its lack of
extensive critical commentary. Readers will eagerly await Janis's second
volume to learn what twentieth-century actors have taken from the individuals
encountered in the first volume, and what new ideas they have brought to the
debate over the proper role of international law in U.S. courts.
Mexican Law. By Stephen Zamora, Jos6 Cossio, Leonel Pereznieto, Jos6
Rolddn-Xopa, and David Lopez. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Pp. xxviii, 699. Price: $116.82 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Carlos R.
Soltero.
If a U.S.-trained lawyer needed a one-volume work on the Mexican legal
system, Mexican Law would be that work. While comprehensive, the book is
written primarily from the perspective of such a lawyer and principally
concerns how and why Mexican law differs from law in the United States.
This book is not just for lawyers, however. Mexican Law offers more than a
translation of laws; it provides thorough and original yet succinct historical
explanations of legal and political differences between the two countries.
Describing the entire legal system of a country such as Mexico, with
over 100 million inhabitants and a federal government, is an enormous
undertaking. Consequently, Mexican Law-whose authors range from a
Mexican supreme court justice, to practitioners from both sides of the border,
to academics with substantial experience teaching Mexican law to U.S.
lawyers and law students-has twenty-two chapters spanning seven hundred
pages. The first eight chapters provide background information, followed by
one chapter on administrative law and a couple on civil and criminal
procedure. The bulk of the second half of the book deals with specific civil
law subject matters, as well as covering just about every general subject area
that would constitute a course at a U.S. law school (e.g., contracts, property,
family law, constitutional law, intellectual property, commercial law). The
final chapter is devoted to conflict of laws.
Apart from providing a description of how the Mexican legal system is
structured and has functioned in the past, Mexican Law elucidates the big
picture legal reforms that have occurred since the watershed election of
President Vincente Fox in 2000, the first president not a member of the
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) since the Mexican Revolution of
1910. Published in 2004, ten years after the enactment of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexican Law also describes how that
agreement and the corresponding liberalization of economic regulations in
Mexico have changed Mexico's legal system. For instance, several chapters
address legal changes in areas of antitrust, the environment, and finance.
Mexican Law observes, however, that notwithstanding numerous legal
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reforms aimed at harmonizing Mexican law with U.S. laws, fundamental
differences remain on the books and in application.
Mexican Law also discusses uniquely Mexican institutions such as
communal farms (ejidos). Recent modifications to laws governing ejidos
allow their owners more of the benefits traditionally associated with private
property, such as the right of alienation or the right to use the property as
collateral. Another example is the discussion of the constitutional limitations
on direct foreign ownership of real estate or land in Mexico (limitations
applicable to all land fifty kilometers from each coast and one hundred
kilometers from the borders) as well as the trusts created to circumvent those
strict rules. Mexican Law also provides an accessible explanation of the
notario, a Mexican attorney specializing in certifying the authenticity of facts
and serving as custodian of official public records. Of particular interest to
people doing business or representing clients in Mexico is the discussion of
the public commercial broker (corredor pablico), a newly created variant of
the notario who not only authenticates legal documents but may also serve as
mediator, arbitrator, or expert appraiser.
The authors reflect upon the various institutions that affect Mexico's
legal system and legal culture, including law schbols, the legal profession, the
political system, and the economy. They also add practical insight, avoiding
the shortcoming of some civil law works that focus on legal theory or doctrine
to the exclusion of real-world problems. The authors state as much: "Studying
Mexican law without taking into account the political system would be an
exercise in unreality" (p. 132). They note further that Mexican law,
particularly the Mexican Constitution of 1917 (which has been amended
"hundreds of times"), is more aspirational than actual, and the reality of
Mexican life does not frequently correspond with constitutional
pronouncements. Apart from being an important read for anyone trying to
understand legal issues in Mexico, moreover, Mexican Law is of historical
interest. The background provided in Chapter 1 links the promulgated laws
and changes to the codes of the past two centuries with political, historical,
and economic events in Mexico's history.
Mexican Law uses Spanish words in the text together with an English
translation, which facilitates understanding of Mexican legal terminology. For
instance, Chapter 8 focuses on a Mexican judicial procedure of great
importance to the legal system known as amparo, by which individuals seek
protection from governmental abuses of authority and which is frequently
used as collaterally to attack state and federal judgments. The book also notes
the formalities of the amparo procedure and its limitations.
The authors dispel the view commonly held by U.S.-trained lawyers that
stare decisis has no place in Mexico, a civil law jurisdiction. Although
Mexico's jurisprudencia is historically less important as a source of law than
case law in the United States, it is increasing in relative importance. Unlike
the United States, with its historical appreciation for a strong judiciary as a
separate and co-equal branch of government, Mexico has historically featured
a generalized distrust of the judiciary. Mexican Law explains why the judicial
power in Mexico has been limited in the name of democratic principles.
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According to the authors, until 1994, the Mexican Supreme Court lacked the
power to declare executive or legislative acts unconstitutional, a power the
U.S. Supreme Court has enjoyed since at least Marbury v. Madison.
Relatedly, although Mexico has a federal system like that of the United
States, Mexico's colonial and authoritarian history of centralized power has
rendered it substantially different-most notably, Mexico's federal
government is far stronger than the state governments and the executive
branch has far more power than the other branches (legislative and judicial). A
particularly interesting example of this power cited in Mexican Law is the
provision involving desaparecion de poderes (disappearance of powers) that
allows Mexico's federal senate to remove any state's governor.
Correspondingly, Mexico's federal laws are particularly dominant.
Commercial law (derecho mercantil) is exclusively federal. Mexican federal
law also governs labor law and education.
Mexican Law is notable for the breadth of its coverage. The authors
highlight procedural differences between the Mexican and U.S. legal systems;
Mexico's system is characterized by the absence of juries, and a
corresponding role for judges as fact-finders and examiners, the lack of a
concentrated public trial (involving instead a primarily pleading-dominated
practice), and the classification of various types of dispute resolution. One
chapter discusses the economic reality of wealth concentration in Mexico, the
government's preeminent role in the economy, and significant differences in
commercial litigation including the tactical use of parallel criminal
proceedings. The criminal law chapter describes types of crimes, the sequence
of proceedings, and the general recognition "of the relationship between
criminal justice and the endemic corruption that has plagued Mexican life for
generations" (p. 345).
Mexican Law's approach, both academic and practical, general and
specific, reflects the broad experience of its authors. This book makes a
significant contribution to understanding Mexican law and an important
contribution to the fields of comparative law and Mexican history.
Theory of the Cosmopolitan
The Democracy Deficit: Taming Globalization through Law Reform. By
Alfred C. Aman, Jr. New York: New York University Press, 2004. Pp.
xii, 252. Price: $45.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Brandon Birdwell.
If globalization is the proverbial bull rampaging unchecked through the
china shop of the twenty-first century, Alfred Aman, Jr., director of the
Indiana University Institute for Advanced Study and a professor at the Indiana
University School of Law, believes he has a deceptively simple harness: to
extend the principles that have traditionally animated domestic administrative
law to the new internationally inspired administrative structures that have
grown up in globalization's wake. The challenge he takes up in The
Democracy Deficit: Taming Globalization through Law Reform is to
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determine just what is meant by "administrative structures" in the global
context.
Aman does an admirable job of explaining the administrative entities
that have emerged during the era of globalization, focusing primarily on their
emergence in the United States. He argues persuasively that these entities and
the strain they put on the democratic process should lead to a rethinking of
common notions of public and private for the purposes of regulation and
control. As a result of the increasing tendency to outsource government
functions and import obligations on governmental action via treaties and the
decisions of international bodies, Aman asserts that national societies face a
growing set of "democracy deficits" in the form of governmental operations
removed from public oversight and direction (pp. 3-5). In the face of these
expanding gaps between the people and the policies of their governments,
Aman argues that globalization should be analyzed from a domestic point of
view, examining how globalization influences the operation of government
and how domestic law can control that influence. The suggestions Aman
comes up with revolve around leveraging administrative law to facilitate
democratic participation in the arenas in which such participation is being
threatened: first, to expand the reach of administrative law to include those
private entities that perform governmental functions; second, to extend the
principles of administrative law to those international bodies such as the
World Trade Organization (WTO) whose decisions impose restrictions on
governmental operations; and third, to reduce the courts' tendency to lock
domestic bodies (primarily the state and federal legislatures) out of decisions
by constitutionalizing an aggregation of power in the executive branch.
The primacy of the executive in the United States contributes to both of
the democracy deficits that Aman spends most of The Democracy Deficit
examining. In the case of the deficits arising from the influence of
international bodies, the executive's foreign affairs power is the principal
culprit; by contrast, the executive's contribution to the deficits arising out of
the privatization phenomenon derives from a more recent evolution of its
"take care" power under Article 2, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution. Since
the New Deal, the courts have facilitated a steady flow of authority over
administrative agencies from the legislative to the executive branch, and
Aman is disturbed by the specter of Congress standing on the sidelines while
the executive-and more importantly, the unelected heads of administrative
agencies-takes it upon itself to deregulate and privatize public institutions.
While Aman is less troubled by the deregulation of purely economic
industries (such as the deregulation of the airline industry under the Jimmy
Carter administration), privatization of what he sees as basic state operations
such as the maintenance of prisons, the servicing of the military, or the
determination of welfare eligibility draws his ire. In Aman's view, it is a pale
imitation of democracy that allows private entities to decide how and when to
provide public services with only periodic review by public officials and no
direct engagement on the part of the populace.
Aman's complaint about the democratic deficit arising from the
influence of international bodies on domestic government operations also
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centers on the removal of fora for democratic participation. In this case, his
principal target is the fast track administrative procedures for harmonizing
domestic practices with obligations under the WTO and other treaty regimes.
Here, Congress essentially rubber stamps rulings by international bodies.
Since the executive negotiates the treaties, and international bodies operate
without the constraints of domestic administrative entities, the body politic is
again largely cut out of these decisions.
Aman's point about the wavering lines between public and private,
national and international is well taken and certainly relevant in the era of
globalization. The roving protests that accompany the meetings of any large
international financial institution (e.g., the WTO or the World Bank) are clear
evidence of a public desire for greater transparency and accountability on the
part of powerful international organizations, while debacles such as the
privatization scheme in California's energy market demonstrate the
significance of the public/private debate. It is difficult to argue with Aman's
advocacy of greater transparency and accountability for administrative bodies,
and particularly hard to imagine an objection to the extension of these values
to international bodies that have traditionally been worryingly opaque. His
suggestion for the judiciary-that the courts ought to be attentive to the
necessity of legislative flexibility in the rapidly changing world of the
globalization era-is quite sensible as well.
Expanding the purview of administrative law beyond what have
traditionally been considered public entities, however, seems to be a trickier
proposition. To begin with, it is not entirely clear how subjecting nominally
private entities to public demands such as submission to Freedom of
Information Act requests will really further Aman's goal of greater democratic
participation in the shaping of public operations. Although it is certainly
commendable to open channels through which citizens may inform
themselves, Aman does not say why such opportunities will inspire action by
the citizenry in the relatively obscure arena of public administration. Indeed,
Yale Law School Professor Bruce Ackerman has argued that such behavior is
rarely undertaken by the populace.
More importantly, The Democracy Deficit does not clearly address how
one is to decide what organizations or private entities ought to be subjected to
higher demands of democracy than the market provides. Although Aman goes
so far as to suggest that there may even be a case for redefining certain large
companies as pseudo-government bodies because of the scale of their
economic influence, he fails to offer a normative argument as to why the
operations of such companies-or any others-should be considered public.
History is replete with private entities whose operations were of a national
scale (e.g., the companies controlled by the American industrial barons of the
turn of the twentieth century), and it is unclear why globalization changes the
calculus of their regulation. Moreover, even services that may generally be
regarded as public often owe their status as much to their history as to
substantive normative arguments. The suggestion that a privatized welfare
system should be subjected to more stringent transparency and accountability
than any other private company may come naturally today (though there are
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certainly those who would debate it), but it surely would have been much
more contentious at the outset of the New Deal.
In the end, the normative question remains largely unanswered. While
Aman views globalization as a force that opens holes in the fabric of
democracy by shifting the loci of public activities, advocates of privatization
and the pure market are likely to offer the retort that the privatization
movement is simply a return to a traditional conception of the public.
Politics and Passion: Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism. By Michael
Walzer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. Pp. xiv, 184. Price:
$25.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Eric Tam.
In Politics and Passion, Michael Walzer, a permanent member of the
faculty at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, attempts to renew and
extend the contribution he made to the now well-worn liberal-communitarian
debate with his 1989 essay "The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism"
(helpfully reprinted as the Appendix to Politics and Passion). In that piece,
Walzer managed to find favor with both sides of the debate. He argued that
communitarians were right to worry about liberals' tendency to
overemphasize the ideal of the autonomous individual, but wrong in thinking
that communitarian theory could replace-rather than merely correct-the
liberal theory underpinning contemporary democracy. Like much of Walzer's
work throughout his long career, his essay succeeded because it reframed a set
of commonsense theoretical ideas in an engaging and novel manner. Walzer
mostly sticks to this formula in Politics and Passion, but the product is less
successful. Walzer's style of judicious restatement is not as compelling now
that the field has become saturated with younger theorists working at the
intersection of theories of liberalism, multiculturalism, gender, and identity.
Although Walzer has never pretended that his method of persuasion through
sociological and literary anecdotes is meant to meet any standard of formal
rigor, in Politics and Passion the lack of support he marshals for his most
novel claims is frustratingly clear.
Walzer now thinks communitarianism has been more than adequately
chastened, and his main project is to ensure that liberal theory's current
imbalances are not neglected. The first liberal imbalance Walzer tackles is the
one illuminated by the familiar communitarian complaint about liberalism's
tendency to undervalue the crucial role of involuntary association and
obligation, while the second touches on liberal theory's bias in favor of reason
over passion. Walzer attempts to ground his arguments concerning these
imbalances in a commonsense, pluralist theory of liberal democracy. In his
view, liberals will arrive at such a pluralist theory once they adopt a
sociologically accurate perspective on the place of involuntary social
groups-for example, ethnic, racial, and religious groups-in contemporary
democracy. This perspective derives from the communitarian
acknowledgment that every individual in liberal society is born into a culture
and socialized by a family he or she did not choose, and that culture and
family give rise to both crucial social resources and deeply felt constraints.
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The first set of multiculturalist arguments Walzer erects on these
pluralist foundations is not new, but it is well constructed. He argues that once
liberalism adopts this understanding of involuntary group ties, it should also
recognize that redressing society's most persistent inequalities may require a
remedy different from the classical liberal prescription of granting group
members equal formal rights and the opportunity to assimilate. Instead,
achieving equality in many cases requires a solution Walzer calls "meat and
potatoes" or "empowerment" multiculturalism: the liberal state must provide
stigmatized groups with resources that enable these groups' "core" activist
members to organize "periphery" members and maintain group-oriented social
welfare institutions (pp. 38-39). As Walzer readily admits, theorists such as
Will Kymlicka, Seyla Benhabib, and Nancy Rosenbaum have covered similar
territory. Walzer's treatment is worthwhile, however, because it reframes
these somewhat familiar ideas under a cleaner conceptual structure and
supports them with compelling examples drawn from the history of American
social movements.
Walzer's attempts to deal with some of the thornier derivative problems
that flow from his theory of multiculturalism are less successful: he raises the
right questions, but his attempts to answer them tend to be indeterminate or
poorly supported. For example, Walzer establishes a neat initial frame for
conceptualizing the problem of the relationship between liberal democracy
and illiberal groups, describing it as a conflict between basic liberal
democratic obligations of citizenship and the obligations imposed by "greedy"
communities. Inspired by sociologist Lewis Coser's Greedy Institutions,
Walzer describes greedy communities as those that require total commitment
to their ideals and therefore exclude the possibility of fulfilling external
obligations. From this promising start, Walzer moves far too quickly, and he
provides only a paragraph's worth of justification for the crucial assertion that
liberalism has some obligation to tolerate communities whose goals explicitly
reject liberal democracy's basic obligations. A charitable reader might excuse
Walzer because he uses these thin foundations to support highly indeterminate
normative conclusions. His most resolute prescription is that liberals should
"tilt decisively against totalizing groups" if further concessions to them would
endanger liberal democracy's survival. Otherwise, Walzer effectively throws
his hands up in the air, stating that "there is no theoretical solution ... only a
long and unstable series of compromises" (p. 65). It is hard to see why any
liberal theory would view this conclusion to be a persuasive "corrective" (p.
x).
The second set of multiculturalist arguments are directed at the general
relationship between rationality and passion in democratic politics. Here,
Walzer continues in the indeterminate mode. For example, he appears set to
launch into a controversial argument when he states that reason and passion
are merely different modes of thought and expression lacking any necessary
relationship to the good or bad nature of social means or ends. Yet Walzer
declines to argue for a non-rational basis of normative judgment. Instead, he
states that such judgments involve "both conviction and passion, reason and
enthusiasm, always in unstable combination" (p. 120). So it turns out that
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Walzer wants only to issue a vague caution to liberals not to get carried away
with rationality. This warning may be a judicious position, but it is hard to
disagree with Walzer when he suggests that it says nothing "excitingly new or
even mildly provocative" (pp. 129-30).
The looseness of Walzer's theory is especially apparent in his broad
attack on deliberative democratic theory. Walzer argues that deliberation-
understood as rational constructive discussion between equals aimed at the
common good-is not a significant independent political activity.
Deliberation cannot be such an activity because politics for Walzer consists
primarily of pluralist conflict between groups with irreconcilable ends.
Reasoned reflection on the common good has little purchase in such a political
context, except as a helpful component of its political culture. This last
conclusion about "how deliberation fits into a democratic political process that
is ... pervasively nondeliberative" would be quite interesting if Walzer had
done more to support his argument that democratic politics is essentially non-
deliberative than just provide a list of non-deliberative political activities (p.
92). As it stands, deliberative democrats could easily object that a major part
of their theoretical project is changing core democratic activities and
institutions so that they become more deliberative.
The concluding reflections on global equality provide a good example of
the book's overall difficulties. Walzer briefly attempts to extend his "meat and
potatoes" multiculturalism to international relations (p. 136). Like
disadvantaged social groups in domestic society, disadvantaged peoples in
international society may require not just individual emancipation from
abusive states but also group empowerment in the form of access to strong
state institutions. As much potential as this argument might have, Walzer can
hardly begin to support it in ten pages. Like much of this short book's other
ideas, Walzer presents the concept in an engaging and suggestive manner, but
he fails to substantiate the aspects of the claim that are original.
Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. By
Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2004. Pp. xi, 226. Price: $45.00 (Cloth) (Paper, $17.95).
Reviewed by Ben Billa.
Responding to international relations theory's long-standing state-
centered bias, in Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global
Politics, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore effectively argue for an
approach that acknowledges international organizations (lOs) as autonomous
actors operating on their own authority. Admittedly, international relations
theorists have modified the early theoretical focus exclusively on state action
by taking account of 1Os. These later amendments, however, have persisted in
giving short shrift to lOs, treating them first as mere byproducts of state action
and later as regimes through which states may act.
Barnett and Finnemore, professors of political science at the University
of Minnesota and George Washington University, respectively, argue that 1Os
are endowed with an authority that derives from delegation, morality,
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expertise, and rationality, and that this authority provides a basis for
autonomous action. At its most basic level, 10 authority is conferred by states,
which put 1Os in charge of certain tasks and confer upon them at least a
sufficient amount of autonomy for them to accomplish those tasks. 1Os derive
an additional source of authority from the principles behind the missions they
pursue, which are generally widely shared and premised on a sense of moral
duty. Technical expertise related to their assigned missions provides added
authority. A fourth source, which the authors term "rational-legal authority,"
flows from the first three (p. 20). By virtue of their creation by multiple states
to employ technical expertise in pursuit of widely shared values, 1Os are
imbued with an air of impartiality and depoliticization that purifies their
action in the eyes of observers and confirms their status as rational-legal
actors.
The authors employ a sociological theory of bureaucracy in the
Weberian tradition, and they analyze three detailed case studies to support
their argument. Yet both the account of bureaucracy theory and the case
studies are largely distractions from the central and most interesting points of
the book. The case studies-on the International Monetary Fund, the U.N.
High Commission for Refugees, and the U.N. Secretariat and Department of
Peacekeeping Operations-are at times interesting, but are more often overly
detailed and poorly framed within the book's argument. Even if the empirical
portion had been better integrated with the argument, however, the principles
of bureaucratic behavior as described by the authors are so many and so
broad, and are meant to apply to such a vast array of organizations in such a
complex international environment, that they seem capable of explaining
nearly anything in retrospect and of predicting next to nothing.
This is not to say that Barnett and Finnemore's book is ineffective. The
central thrust of their argument-that 1Os merit recognition and study as
autonomous actors with particular cultures, agendas, and histories that
influence their action and therefore the world-is immediately plausible and is
well argued in the introductory chapter. By calling attention to a significant
and long-ignored area of action, Barnett and Finnemore make an important
contribution to international relations scholarship. The task of demonstrating
general applicability of a complex set of principles across all international
organizations (numbering at least 238) that vary along multiple axes not only
in their internal structure but also in their external environments is likely an
impossible one. Yet the authors' call to international relations theorists to pay
attention to particular institutions operating in the international arena is
entirely reasonable. Indeed, it is likely to produce a substantially enhanced
vision of the world system.
In addition to effectively arguing for the recognition of 1Os as
autonomous and influential actors, the authors successfully track important
trends in 10 behavior-a propensity for expansion and a proclivity for
dysfunction. All three case studies provide strong evidence for the
expansionist tendency, and a comparison of the broad moral and aspirational
claims of 1Os with their often narrow mandates provides a persuasive
theoretical explanation for this propensity. Furthermore, the scope of 10
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action often expands in response to failure, as 1Os acknowledge additional
variables and realms of possible action. As the authors discuss, lOs also
broaden their reach through the application of legitimating principles to new
situations outside of the original mandate. Likewise, ample evidence for
pervasive dysfunction is provided in both the empirical and theoretical
discussions.
Of course, anyone who has looked at a recent flow chart of U.N. offices
already suspects tendencies toward expansion and dysfunction to be innate
characteristics of 1Os. More interesting are two questions raised by the
existence of these traits, which Barnett and Finnemore treat only briefly in the
last section of the book. First, given the prevalence of dysfunction, what are
the effects of 1Os' expansion? The authors point out that this expansion has
implications not only for the international system but for domestic systems as
well, and that 1Os exert a substantial amount of power over each. 1Os classify
problems, define new interests and tasks, legitimate actors to carry out those
tasks, and create new preferences and values. They use this power to promote
a liberal, moral vision of the world. "10 expansion, in short, entails creating
particular kinds of states with particular kinds of interests" (p. 165).
"Bureaucratizing world politics" (p. 1), the alternative phrase employed by the
authors to refer to 10 expansion, places substantial authority in the hands of
global bureaucrats; for citizens of states subjected to this authority, it can at
times mean "emancipation, at other times domination" (p. 166). Whether the
pathologies exhibited by 1Os outweigh the positive contributions they make is
left open to debate.
The second question the authors should have treated in greater depth is
whether expanded 10 action is legitimate, especially in terms of its
implications for accountability and democracy. Here the authors point to
certain efforts made by IOs to achieve greater legitimacy but conclude that
critics and reasons to criticize will remain for the foreseeable future. They
anticipate that nongovernmental organizations and other groups will
increasingly have interests in holding 1Os accountable, and they warn against
the possible pitfalls of pushing undemocratic liberalism. Barnett and
Finnemore point to what they see as a great irony of lOs-that they are
undemocratic institutions pursuing liberal goals-and worry that in chasing
liberal goals, liberals will ignore the interests of the states and citizens who are
supposed to benefit from that liberalism. Looking to the future, Barnett and
Finnemore conclude that "[m]anaging our global bureaucracy and learning to
exploit its strengths while moderating its failings will be an essential task" (p.
173).
While the authors present a convincing argument for the revision of
international relations theory to consider 1Os in a new light, their discussion of
the two big picture questions their observations raise is disappointing to the
international lawyer. Efforts to describe 10 successes or what the world would
look like without them are sorely lacking. Also missing are suggestions as to
enhancing 10 legitimacy and effectiveness. Indeed, for the international legal
expert, likely already familiar with the quirks and consequences of 10
bureaucratic culture, the book, rather than offering concrete guidance for
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improving lOs, may do little more than put into words some of the frustrations
of dealing with them.
War and State-Building
What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building. By Noah
Feldman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. 154. Price:
$19.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Adil Ahmad Haque.
Noah Feldman's engaging and surprisingly personal second book
disappoints in at least three respects. Feldman, a law professor at New York
University and former constitutional adviser to the Coalition Provisional
Authority in Baghdad, declines to evaluate the legality and morality of the
titular war. He similarly neglects to discuss the titular project of nation-
building-the formation of an autonomous collective moral agent-writing
instead only of state-building-the formation of stable political institutions.
Finally, although Feldman makes a great number of ethical claims, they do not
amount to a complete or convincing theory of what we owe Iraq, of the
affirmative obligations of the United States to aid in reconstruction. When
pressed to defend his strongest ethical claims Feldman makes no reference to
his theory, drawing instead on more familiar and compelling moral grounds.
The third disappointment runs deepest, for Feldman's title promises an
advance over the acute moral solipsism of his first book, After Jihad: America
and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy (2003). There Feldman supported his
policy proposals through appeals to the self-interest and moral purity of the
United States. Scattered references in the introduction and conclusion to
Muslims deserving democracy amount to little more than window dressing.
But to speak of what the United States owes Iraq, of duties and obligations to
the Iraqi people, is necessarily to speak of Iraqis as holders of rights and
sources of moral claims against the United States, as persons rather than
opportunities for profit or the display of virtue.
Feldman's efforts at self-improvement get off to a bad start. In the first
chapter of What We Owe Iraq, he argues that "the objective of nation building
ought to be the creation of reasonably legitimate, reasonably liberal
democracies" (p. 8). This objective in turn serves the "primary objective" of
national defense: strong democracies create fewer anti-American terrorists (p.
11). Feldman does not articulate a moral obligation to engage in nation-
building and then show that this obligation does not conflict with national
self-interest. Rather, he argues that self-interest alone is sufficient to justify
nation-building projects so long as its pursuit does not set back the interests of
other nations. Even this constraint is qualified: Feldman acknowledges that
one may sometimes act contrary to the interests of others. It is highly
convenient, then, that "living under a democratically legitimate government
that respects basic rights coincides with a people's interests" (p. 25).
Feldman's constrained self-interest principle cannot generate affirmative
duties toward Iraqis because it is permissive, not mandatory: it says that the
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United States may pursue its self-interested goals "so long as [our] goals
coincide with or at least do not conflict with the interests of other people" (p.
22). The United States may choose to contribute to reconstruction, though if it
does it must obey certain constraints. But it has no affirmative obligation to
start the project, so even these negative obligations arise and fall away at its
choosing. Yet to speak of what we owe Iraq is to speak not of preference but
of moral necessity, for the power to waive a duty lies not with its bearer but
with its recipient.
The second chapter argues that the United States holds the authority to
govern Iraq in trust for the Iraqi people, to be relinquished following
democratic elections. Since authority was not entrusted to the United States
but was seized by force, the model of trusteeship generates not a right to
govern but merely a familiar constraint: "the nation builder may pursue its
own interests in security so long as these coincide with the interests of the
occupied people" (p. 65). Feldman argues that this constraint is best enforced
by the occupied through broad freedoms of speech and assembly, as well as
representation by officials whose future in politics depends on their
responsiveness to popular will.
Both the duty not to limit expression and assembly and the duty to create
representative bodies are derivative obligations to take necessary steps to
comply with the constrained self-interest principle. As such, the United States
chooses to undertake these duties as burdens on the pursuit of its self-interest,
and it can cast them aside should self-interest favor a different set of goals.
Feldman states that the United States has a moral duty to produce order in Iraq
and preside over the formation of democratic institutions. But in his view the
goal of creating functioning democracies is the goal of nation-building, a goal
he defends on the basis of national self-interest, not moral obligation.
For these derivative duties to have any bite, Feldman must show that the
United States cannot abandon reconstruction without violating its obligations
to Iraqis. The obligation to remain cannot be drawn from the constrained self-
interest principle like gold from lead, yet if that principle does not explain
what we owe Iraq then the first and longest chapter of the book may as well be
filled with blank pages. Feldman insists on the unity and coherence of his
view, referring to a single hypothesis developed throughout the book's three
chapters, and describing trusteeship obligations as derivations from his
general account of nation-building. Yet when it comes time to explain why the
United States may not leave Iraq at its pleasure, Feldman gives two rationales
that rely in no way on what has come before.
The first rationale is forward-looking: An Iraq without a stable,
democratic government would be "much worse than Afghanistan as a
breeding ground for terror-but far more important it would spell disaster for
the lives of ordinary Iraqis .... And it would sit on 10 percent of the world's
proven oil reserves" (p. 50). That the sentence fragment referring to the
interests of Iraqis lies between considerations of national defense and finance
is perhaps enough to show that Feldman cannot rest a decisive piece of his
argument on this passage or others like it.
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The second rationale is backward-looking: "We got ourselves-and the
Iraqis-into a serious fix: and we must see it through" (p. 91). On this view,
the duty to oversee reconstruction is a remedial one, a duty to make whole
those whose rights the United States has infringed. Feldman's first problem is
that he wishes to avoid judgment of the invasion itself; yet one cannot call for
a remedy without first declaring a wrong. Feldman must therefore address the
ethics of the war before determining what we owe Iraq. His second problem is
that principles of corrective justice likely demand extensive monetary
reparation to Iraqi war victims. Such reparations place morality firmly ahead
of self-interest, a familiar ordering that Feldman nonetheless remains hesitant
to advocate.
A final concern: Feldman's exclusive focus on state-building contributes
to a growing misperception that U.S. control over Iraq will end with the
emergence of stable domestic political institutions. Today, however, the
foreign domination of nations and peoples that Feldman abhors is primarily
effected through economic coercion rather than military force. If Americans
are seduced by the magic of elections and distracted by the homecoming of
U.S. soldiers, U.S. influence in Iraq will take a form all too familiar to the
developing world.
Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World.
By Jean Bethke Elshtain. New York: Basic Books, 2003. Pp. xi, 251.
Price: $14.00 (Paperback). Reviewed By Richard Owen Morgan.
The foundations of just war theory may be traced to St. Augustine who,
writing during the turbulent years of the early fifth century, sought to
reconcile the traditional pacifism of Christianity to the military necessities of
the post-Constantine Roman Empire. Over the centuries, as the theory has
been adapted, secularized, and incorporated into international law to
accommodate political developments, the purposes to which it has been put
have expanded beyond the range of the Augustinian moral compass, which
was designed for combatants and their commanders as they made decisions
about how and when to go to war. Today, just war theory is also used by
national leaders to justify their action or inaction on the international scene; as
Michael Walzer has noted, the just war concepts of proportionality and
discrimination have become the lingua franca of U.S. commanders with
respect to the conduct of military operations in the wake of Vietnam.
Additionally, these same concepts form the basis of international agreements
that seek reciprocal recognition by combatants of those laws of war beneficial
to all parties. For example, prohibitions against the use of biological or
chemical agents and other weapons of mass destruction are derived from their
disproportionate and indiscriminate nature.
It is in light of these aims of just war theory-providing guidelines for
the conduct of combatants, justification for war, and reciprocity between
waing states-that readers must judge Just War Against Terror by Jean
Bethke Elshtain, a professor of social and political ethics at the University of
Chicago Divinity School. The original edition of the work was published in
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the interim between the toppling of the Taliban regime and the
commencement of hostilities in Iraq, and therefore the bulk of Elshtain's
argument focuses on U.S. action with respect to Afghanistan.
Elshtain was "a principal author and signatory" of a February 2002
statement of human rights principles ("What We're Fighting For") signed by
60 U.S. intellectuals (discussed on pp. 64-65, 74-76, and included in an
appendix). Along with Christian theology, she draws on this piece to make the
argument that U.S. actions in Afghanistan conform to the tradition of just war
theory. Elshtain claims that the Taliban regime's disrespect for the
fundamental rights of the individual (and women in particular) satisfies the
casus belli requirement of the theory, and that the rules of engagement
employed in the prosecution of the war meet the dictates of proportionality
and discrimination. "The United States," she writes, "must do everything it
can to minimize civilian deaths-and it is doing so" (p. 69).
The justice of U.S. action in Afghanistan (as well as in Iraq, discussed
briefly in a 2003 epilogue) aside, however, Elshtain's defense of the
Afghanistan campaign is problematic. Elshtain ignores just war theory's
strong secular tradition and instead anchors her argument primarily in
Christian theology, drawing on the writings of H. Richard Niebuhr and Paul
Tillich (as well as very loosely upon the works of the late Pope John Paul II),
which argue that evil is a fundamental reality that threatens the existence of
civic peace. Christians therefore have a duty as adherents to a religion of both
peace and justice to confront such evil, incarnate in groups such as al-Qaida
and the Taliban. Such a religious line of argument would be appropriate were
Elshtain's intended audience fellow theologians or the Christian laity;
however, her appeals throughout the book are global in scope. Whereas
Elshtain acknowledges the separation of church and state, her frequent
theoretic conflation of the United States and Christianity is unlikely to play
well with a heterogeneous domestic audience, much less with the United
States' increasingly secular allies. Of greater concern, however, is the effect
such justification may have on moderate Muslims, who might view Elshtain's
work as evidence that the United States sees what the Bush administration
terms the Global War on Terror as a religious crusade.
If Just War Against Terror provides a flawed justification for war, it
fails completely to guide combatants in the conduct of the current campaign
against terrorism. Elshtain accepts the traditional criteria for a just war and
then seeks to apply them to the present state of world events. However,
Elshtain fails to acknowledge sufficiently that a Global War on Terror-of
which the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are regrettably but inevitably only a
part-poses serious challenges to a theory that for the past five hundred years
has been developed within the Westphalian framework of the sovereign state.
Modem terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida simultaneously embrace and
reject the concept of state sovereignty, benefiting from the shelter and
infrastructure that sovereignty provides while seeking to undermine states on
behalf of a transnational movement they claim to represent. Terrorists work to
neutralize the asymmetry of resources existing between them and the states
they seek to attack through decentralization, and by obscuring the line
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between combatant and noncombatant, between home front and the front
lines. Elshtain does not address the problems that this blurring of lines creates
for state actors who seek to abide by the jus in bello rules of discrimination
and proportionality. The Global War on Terror upon which Elshtain focuses
has been primarily waged on sovereign states that are or are alleged to be
associated with transnational terrorist organizations. This correlation is
unlikely to hold consistently in future conflicts in the Global War on Terror.
The problems for just war theory, and Elshtain's discussion of it, do not
stop there. The rejection of the system of sovereignty by transnational terrorist
organizations is an implicit rejection of the laws of war and rules of
engagement. A theory of justice in war that transcends cultural lines--derived
from a reconciliation of the just war doctrines of the world's great religions-
could perhaps form a basis for mutual restraint in this new age of combat.
However, Elshtain's discussion of non-Christian just war theory is too cursory
and at times dismissive to contribute to that debate. Furthermore, it has been a
staple of jus ad bellum literature that there must be a reasonable hope of
success for a war to be just. But what is the definition of success in the Global
War on Terror? With a decentralized opponent that chooses when, where,
how, and why to attack, and that may be dormant for years, how can anyone
know whether victory has been achieved? Does the nature of terrorism
necessitate preemption and clandestine action on the part of states, and does it
excuse the jus ad bellum requirements of last resort to, and open declaration
of, war?
Elshtain addresses none of these important questions. Instead, by
focusing on the human rights abuses of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein
regimes, she has produced a work that explores the justification for states to
engage in war against other states that undermine their own sovereignty by
abusing their citizens and subjects. This just war theory question is as old as
the system of nation states itself; the mistitled Just War Against Terror adds
nothing to this debate.
Elshtain's work is likely to appeal to those who have already formed
their opinions about the justice of the Afghan and Iraqi wars. For the
undecided, her often anecdotal evidence and categorical acceptance and
rejection of various controversial issues may seem unconvincing at best, and
partisan at worst. In such uncertain and transitional times, a thoughtful
exploration of the ethical and moral dimensions of the current war on
terrorism is greatly needed. Unfortunately, Just War Against Terror is not that
work.
Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International
Legal Order. By Gerry Simpson. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004. Pp. xix, 391. Price: $95.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by
George Stephanov Georgiev.
Presidential rhetoric about an "axis of evil" in January 2002, and the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq only a year later, reenergized the debates among
political scientists and legal theorists about sovereign equality and the power
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structure of the international system. How are some states relegated to the
status of pariahs, what special rights do great powers have, and how can the
egalitarian nature of the nation-state system be reconciled with substantive
inequalities in state power? Gerry Simpson, a senior lecturer in law at the
London School of Economics, approaches these questions from historical and
theoretical perspectives and makes a meaningful contribution to the common
understanding of the construction and limits of state sovereignty.
The book's key insight is that respect for the principle of sovereign
equality has not been static over time, but has risen and fallen based on the
goals of the great powers and in response to institutional projects in
international diplomacy. More fundamentally, sovereign equality is not
applied similarly to all members of the international community. Powerful
states have guarded their own sovereignty tenaciously, but they have not been
squeamish about subjugating the sovereignty of lesser states using the
language of humanitarian intervention and self-defense.
From this point of departure, Simpson introduces a theory of a different
version of sovereignty, what he terms "juridical sovereignty," which is
constructed by the interplay between classical sovereign equality on the one
hand and two forms of inequality, "legalized hegemony" and "anti-pluralism,"
on the other (p. 6). Grasping these new concepts is at times a challenge
because the book simultaneously uses detailed historical case studies to define
the terms and to apply them in search of a deeper understanding of
sovereignty. The 1815 Congress of Vienna is interpreted as a moment of
conscious regime construction that codifies the inequality between great
powers and lesser states and creates a system of legalized hegemony. This
system is then continually modified, first by an expansion of state equality at
the 1907 Hague Peace Conference and then at the 1945 San Francisco
Conference that created the United Nations, and by a reversal, toward
legalized hegemony, during and after the Cold War.
If legalized hegemony is a manifestation of the special status of great
powers, then the ideological and moral anti-pluralism of these powers is what
creates outlaw states. Simpson carefully traces the construction of outlaws in
philosophical thought and in real world diplomacy. He argues that the
pluralism of the early U.N. years has been replaced by a staunch anti-
pluralism in which Western powers challenge or even disregard the
sovereignty of states that allegedly behave criminally or that do not match a
certain favored political order. The military interventions in Kosovo in 1999
and Afghanistan in 2001, as well as the creation of the International Criminal
Court, are to Simpson proof of this renewed erosion of sovereignty motivated
by anti-pluralism.
In the book's penultimate and perhaps most interesting chapter, Simpson
examines the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan through the prism of
juridical sovereignty. He posits a debate between those who believe that the
U.S. intervention was justified under the universal principle of self-defense
(pragmatists) and those who look at the semantics of the two U.N. Security
Council resolutions and refuse to find a legal basis for the intervention
(formalists). Without stopping to evaluate the merits of the latter position, the
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book suggests that both the pragmatists and the formalists are mired in a view
of international law that requires them to apply their version of self-defense
norms equally to all states. According to Simpson, such equal application is
wrong. The international juridical order is composed of unequal sovereigns
with unequal sovereignties and what is legal for great powers is not legal for
other states. The United States thus acted legally against terrorists based in
Afghanistan by invading the entire country, but a similar action on the part of
India against Pakistan, for example, would be squarely illegal. In the end, the
concepts of anti-pluralism and legalized hegemony discussed earlier are used
to illustrate-convincingly-that great powers and outlaw states enjoy
different rights derived from different sovereignties. These distinctions are
grounded in an international legal order constructed by the great powers
themselves and are not merely a function of power politics.
Simpson's other historical case studies are rich in detail and helpful in
understanding the unstable nature of the interaction between the ideal of
sovereign equality and the reality of power inequalities. The book will
therefore be of great use for those less familiar with the history of
international regime construction and the frequent renegotiations of state
sovereignty.
For all its sophistication, however, the bulk of the study leaves the
advanced reader somewhat unsatisfied. More a historian than a social
scientist, Simpson uses a new vocabulary to retell an old story. The tale is
interesting and the concepts defined here might well become a standard part of
the discourse on sovereign equality. It is disappointing, however, that the book
lacks a comprehensive conclusion about the future of sovereignty, the survival
prospects of outlaws, or the competing pressures of anti-pluralism and
legalized hegemony.
If it seems that not much in the book is groundbreaking, it is not due to a
dearth of ideas. Simpson himself hints at many intriguing questions as he goes
along but seems reluctant to pursue them. After Simpson's discussion of how
legalized hegemony has encroached upon sovereignty historically, the reader
is left wondering about the implications of different versions of juridical
sovereignty for peace within the international system. Examining the
relationship among legal configurations of sovereignty, hegemony, and
regime stability would have enabled Simpson to make a strong contribution to
focal debates within the field of international relations. Realists such as Henry
Kissinger and Stephen Krasner have long theorized about hegemony and
regime stability but their work treats state sovereignty as a uni-dimensional
variable and lacks the kind of nuanced, law-based understanding on offer
here. One can only hope that Simpson will use the theories developed in this
work to engage in a normative study of the relationship between different
sovereignties and international peace.
Another example of the book's limited scope is that it discusses only
sovereigns and makes little or no mention of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), international courts, or transnational networks. Each of these entities,
however, is crucial to the redefinition of sovereign equality. The recent
International Court of Justice decision in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
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(Mexico v. United States) and President Bush's subsequent executive order
mandating domestic compliance with the ruling are a case in point. Anti-death
penalty NGOs helped Mexico, certainly not a great power, to challenge the
sovereignty of the United States successfully, all within the system of
legalized hegemony.
Ultimately, Great Powers and Outlaw States reminds readers that
sovereignty has a long history and is a complex concept with many
constitutive elements. By working at the intersection of several disciplines,
Simpson offers one systematic way to account for law in the study of
international relations and for power in the study of international law. Books
of this sort are especially useful at a time when the shadows of state power in
the world legal order are as visible as ever. The ultimate test for the success of
Simpson's work will be whether his re-conceptualization of sovereignty is
embraced by other scholars writing about these questions.
Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. By P.W.
Singer. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. Pp. 330. Price $19.95
(Paperback). Reviewed by Nick Caton.
Privatization has become virtually a way of life in the United States.
Telephone service was opened for competition long ago, and an increasing
number of governmental operations-including water, electricity, and garbage
collection-are being assigned to the market. For many in the United States,
however, the gruesome photographs of the mutilated and burnt bodies of four
U.S. defense contractors in Iraq published on March 31, 2004, served as a
startling revelation of the extent of privatization of the nation's defense.
In fact, subcontracting martial functions to private military firms (PMFs)
has become quite common in recent years. Halliburton, one of many
corporations providing logistical support in Iraq, has performed services
valued at $9.6 billion as of February 25, 2005, and this number is projected to
increase by $6 billion per year, according to the U.S. Army. With estimates of
force strength above 20,000, PMFs easily outnumber British soldiers, who at
5,000 represent the largest state presence in Iraq after the United States.
Opening certain military functions to competition ostensibly makes the
military more efficient, but it introduces a perverse incentive previously alien
to warfare: corporate profit. The ultimate goal of a state in warfare is usually
quick and decisive victory, whereas PMFs prize profits-a metric often
maximized by a prolonged conflict. Peter W. Singer, a scholar at the
Brookings Institution, seeks to highlight this tension, as well as the history and
breadth of the PMF industry generally, in Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the
Privatized Military Industry.
Singer provides a comprehensive survey of PMIF activity throughout the
world. He touches briefly on conflicts in scores of countries, and he examines
the industry's origins in both the broad twentieth-century trend toward
privatization and the cheap arms markets that developed following the Cold
War. Singer presents such disparate examples as firms that provide only
logistical services and those that have engaged in battle in countries such as
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Angola, Colombia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The myriad
incarnations of PMFs, the services they provide, and the clientele they work
with present significant challenges in classifying firms, and even in
understanding the types of firms that should properly be considered PMFs.
Unfortunately, Singer does not attempt an organized classification of the
industry until well into his work, and even then it remains unclear whether his
generalizations and warnings regarding the PMF industry apply across the
board or only to its most unsavory members. This confusion is a regrettable
flaw in a compelling work otherwise clearly written and extensively
researched.
The success of Corporate Warriors comes in highlighting the extensive
use of PMFs, and in calling for examination of the danger inherent in turning
over a quintessentially government action to a profit-driven entity. The
prevalence of PMFs in U.S. operations is astounding; as Singer notes, "[e]very
major American military operation in the post-Cold War era has involved
considerable levels of support and activity by private firms offering services
that the U.S. military used to perform on its own" (p. 16). Every function
turned over by the government to the private sector involves a shifting of
incentives; the state's desire for victory becomes colored by the corporation's
desire for profits. Theoretically, the market constrains PMFs in their actions:
they can maximize long-run profits by aligning their interests with those of
their clients. This theory, however, assumes a level of market sophistication
that is not present with PMFs, as contracts are often shrouded in secrecy and
competition is constrained by political handouts.
When subcontracting to PMFs, the government depends on the market to
discourage behavior-from refusing orders to working with the enemy-that
is so inimical to good order and discipline in the military that such disloyalty
by soldiers has generally resulted in confinement, court martial, or even
execution in war. In contrast, PMFs are able to make decisions based on their
immediate financial interests with little fear of long-term reputational, much
less personal, cost. Accordingly, the decisions made in the execution of a
contract do not necessarily conform to those that the government or military
personnel would have made in the same situation. For example, Singer notes
that some PMFs contracted by the United States strategically breached
contracts after local conditions made performance unprofitable. In this
situation, the government had the option of terminating the contract or
refusing future dealings, but such ex post regulatory mechanisms are effective
only if the PMFs consider long-run reputational harm in ex ante decision
making. Cost and profit may dictate a firm's methods and even non-
performance, rather than more costly yet nationally beneficial solutions.
Militaries usually want to win at all costs, whereas a private firm will do so
only as long as it is profitable.
Additionally, U.S. civilians, even those performing military roles, do not
fall under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, allowing PMFs the choice to
breach contracts strategically rather than perform. PMFs' immunity from the
code also clouds the question of whether and how the companies will be held
accountable, and who would hold them so, for human rights violations or
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other crimes. As Iraq's legal system struggles to get off the ground, for
example, it is unlikely that its first prosecutorial targets after Saddam's regime
will be the PMF personnel who provide the security it depends on, even
though there have been suggested links between PMFs and the Abu Ghraib
scandal. This cloaking of the activities of PMFs threatens the transparency in
military activities that is essential for accountability. Indeed, there is a risk
that a state may decide it can hire a PMF to perform functions it cannot
perform itself for political or even legal reasons, for PMFs promise a cover of
secrecy and plausible deniability that official forces often do not enjoy.
Ironically, a related danger is that PMFs may work against the political
interests of their clients or home countries. As Singer explains, considering its
close political ties, a surprising issue with Halliburton and its Brown & Root
holding has been concerns with contravention of U.S. foreign policy goals. A
number of the firm's subsidiaries are based outside the United States and
operate in countries that have not always been U.S. allies, including Angola,
Libya, and Algeria, in some cases, in violation of U.S. government sanctions.
Halliburton answers ultimately to its shareholders based on its financial
performance, not its conformity to U.S. policy initiatives; as a profit-
maximizing firm, it need only consider the interests of the U.S. government to
the extent that failing to do so may damage it in the long run.
Most significantly, Singer's work raises questions about the
sustainability of the idea of the state as the primary actor in international
relations. As Max Weber explained in Theory of Social and Economic
Organization, one of the defining characteristics of the modem state is that it
holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force for the maintenance
of social order. The proliferation of PMFs, however, removes force from the
monopoly control of the state and places it in the hands of the highest bidder.
As Singer notes, "nonstate groups that were previously at a severe
disadvantage in a state-dominated system, now have new force mobilization
options and new paths to power" (p. 180). The military support and combat
services that PMFs supply to the global market demand a reconsideration of
global power dynamics. Current international law speaks only to the role of
individual mercenaries and has been found inapplicable to the actions of the
PMF industry. This vacuum in the law needs to be addressed, as decentralized
non-state groups can increasingly easily purchase and wield great power. In
this context, Singer's Corporate Warriors represents an important first step in
framing the importance of such reform.
